دانشگاه اصفهان مطالعات وقف و امور خیریه 3115-7475 4 2 2026 09 23 Challenges of Applying General Rules of Civil Liability to Managers of Non-Administered Endowments and Proposing an Efficient Model in Iran's Legal System چالش‌های اعمال قواعد عمومی مسئولیت مدنی نسبت به مدیران موقوفات غیرمتصرفی و ارائۀ الگوی کارآمد در نظام حقوقی ایران 143 168 30857 10.22108/ecs.2026.149244.1200 FA حبیب الله رحیمی دانشیار گروه حقوق، دانشکدۀ حقوق دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی تهران، تهران، ایران عباس طوسی دانشیار گروه حقوق، دانشکدۀ حقوق دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی تهران، تهران، ایران سروش فخرایی دانشجوی دکتری حقوق خصوصی دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی تهران، تهران، ایران 0009-0000-9140-5035 Journal Article 2026 06 09 Introduction Waqf, as one of the social institutions, has always played an undeniable role in providing for the public interest. The Iranian legal system has divided the management of endowments into two categories: possessory endowments (mawqufat-e motasarefi) and non-possessory endowments (mawqufat-e gheyre-motasarefi). In the second category, which is the subject of this study, the legislature has recognized the trustee's managerial independence and limited the role of the Endowments Organization to mere supervision (Sedaghati & Jalali, 2016, 199). Despite this managerial independence, a reflection on endowment regulations reveals that these laws are almost entirely focused on the legal relationship between the trustee and the endowment itself. On the contrary, the legislature, and consequently legal scholarship, have neglected to articulate the trustee's civil liability regime vis-à-vis third parties. This gap becomes more acute when we consider that, pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code and according to the prevailing view of jurists, a trustee does not have the right to resign after accepting the position and must continue administering the endowment until the end of their tenure (Katouzian, 2005, 226), while the trustee's financial capacity and ability to compensate for potential damages have never been considered as a condition for assuming the office of trusteeship (Sedaghati, 2014, 53-54). A review of the research literature shows that studies conducted in the field of liability of endowment administrators have primarily focused on the trustee's contractual liability toward the endowment and the beneficiaries. The fundamental question is whether the general rules of civil liability and jurisprudential principles can be applied to the office of trusteeship without modification. Methodology The present study employs a descriptive-analytical method with logical inference based on library data, including statutory laws, Imami and Sunni jurisprudential texts, and legal sources. A comparative study with the institution of trust in the common law system and an examination of liability-modifying institutions in Iranian law (liability of judges and corporate directors) have also been conducted, and the final model has been presented based on economic analysis of law and jurisprudential foundations. Findings The findings of the research indicate that although the general rules of civil liability and jurisprudential principles hold the trustee liable when the elements of liability are met (Safaei & Rahimi, 2020, 56), the unconditional application of these rules to the office of trusteeship entails widespread undesirable consequences: A) Conflict with the principle of full compensation, because trustees do not necessarily possess the financial capacity to compensate for heavy damages arising from the management of vast endowments, while the endowment itself typically enjoys stable and substantial financial resources (Amini & Abak, 2014, 85); B) A sharp reduction in the incentive to accept trusteeship, resulting in a managerial vacuum that leads to maximal and inefficient government (Endowments Organization) intervention in the administration of endowments, concentrating both supervision and administration in a single institution. This is consistent with the economic analysis of law, which demonstrates that increased civil liability reduces the willingness to accept high-risk positions (Bertoli & Grembi, 2017, 4-16); C) Reduced efficiency and productivity of endowments through the creation of defensive behaviors in trustees, excessive investment in safety, and avoidance of beneficial but risky activities (Riahi Samani, 2012, 94); D) Conflict with the efficiency of the civil liability system from the perspective of economic analysis, because the rule of strict liability, contrary to the objectives of optimal deterrence and distributive justice, increases social costs (Shavell, 2009, 67). In contrast, a comparative study of the institution of trust and an examination of the modified liability regime for judges and commercial company directors demonstrate that efficient legal systems, by distinguishing degrees of fault, place managerial risks arising from slight errors on the legal personality of the institution (the state, the company, or the endowment), so as to preserve managers' incentives while ensuring full compensation for injured parties. Discussion and Conclusion The results of the research indicate that the optimal model for the civil liability of non-possessory endowment administrators can be designed based on the distinction of degrees of fault and relying on the independent legal personality of the endowment. This model, which draws inspiration by way of analogy from similar institutions in the Iranian legal system (judicial liability and corporate directors' liability), delineates two levels of liability: First, in cases of slight or very slight fault, the damage inflicted on third parties is regarded as an inherent risk of endowment management and is borne by the legal personality of the endowment. The damage is paid from the endowment's revenues as current costs of exploitation or preservation of the corpus. This approach is consistent with the practice of rational persons and the principle of imposing loss on the beneficiary and, from the perspective of economic analysis, ensures the optimal level of activity and precaution on the part of the trustee. Second, in cases of gross fault, very gross fault, or intentional wrongdoing, the trustee is personally liable, in accordance with the general rules of civil liability (Article 1 of the Civil Liability Act and the principles of destruction and causation), for full compensation of the damage inflicted. This dual model, while ensuring full and fair compensation for injured parties, preserves the incentive of capable and efficient trustees to accept the office of trusteeship and prevents a managerial vacuum; it also respects the intentions of the endower and prevents excessive and maximal government intervention in endowment affairs. مقررات خاص اوقافی عمدتاً ناظر بر رابطۀ متولی با خود موقوفه هستند و مسئولیت قهری وی در برابر اشخاص ثالث با خلأ نظری و چالش‌های عملی مواجه است. از این رو، پژوهش حاضر با هدف ارائۀ الگویی مناسب برای مسئولیت مدنی مدیران موقوفات غیرمتصرفی در نظام حقوقی ایران و با بهره گیری از روش توصیفی-تحلیلی و استنتاج منطقی و با استفاده از داده‌های کتابخانه‌ای شامل قوانین موضوعه، متون فقه امامیه، فقه عامه، مطالعۀ تطبیقی نهاد تراست در نظام کامن لا و تحلیل اقتصادی حقوق انجام شده است. یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد قواعد عمومی مسئولیت مدنی و قواعد فقهی، متولی را در فرض اجتماع ارکان مسئولیت، ضامن می‌شناسد؛ ولی اعمال بی‌قیدوشرط این قواعد به دلیل ویژگی‌های خاص تولیت از جمله عدم جواز استعفا و عدم لزوم تمکن مالی متولی، آثاری نامطلوب همچون کاهش انگیزۀ پذیرش سمت تولیت، مداخلۀ حداکثری حکومت، کاهش بهره‌وری موقوفات و گاه نقض اصل جبران کامل خسارت را به دنبال دارد. با بهره‌گیری از تجربیات تعدیل‌گرانه در مسئولیت مدنی قضات و مدیران شرکت‌های تجاری و با تکیه بر شخصیت حقوقی موقوفه، الگوی پیشنهادی مبتنی بر تفکیک درجات تقصیر است: در تقصیرهای سبک یا بسیار سبک متولی، خسارت واردشده به اشخاص ثالث به عنوان ریسک مدیریت به عهدۀ شخصیت حقوقی موقوفه قرار می‌گیرد؛ اما در رابطه با تقصیر سنگین و بسیار سنگین، متولی شخصاً مطابق قواعد عمومی مسئولیت مدنی مسئول جبران خسارت خواهد بود. این الگو ضمن حفظ انگیزۀ متولیان و احترام به نیات واقف، جبران عادلانۀ خسارت زیان‌دیدگان را تأمین می‌کند و با مبانی فقهی و بنای عقلا سازگار است.

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